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The Caroline Affair in the
Evolving International Law of
Self-Defense
MATTHEW C. WAXMAN
Review of Craig Forcese, Destroying the Caroline: The Frontier Raid that
Reshaped the Right to War (Irwin Law, 2018)
The story of the Caroline goes roughly like
this: In the darkness of night on December
29, 1837, an expedition of Canadian
militia, under the authority of Great
Britain, crossed the Niagara River to the
U.S. shore where the American steamer
Caroline was docked. Rebels fighting the
Canadian government were encamped
nearby, and the vessel had been used by
sympathetic Americans to transport
supplies and arms to the group. The
Canadian raiding party set the Caroline
ablaze and untied it from its moorings.
Strong river currents quickly took the
crumbling vessel over Niagara Falls.
Subsequent
public
accounts
were
exaggerated
and
contradictory,
but
probably one American was killed during
the raid and resulting firefight.

not deal with itself (or in today’s
international parlance, the United States
was unwilling or unable to neutralize the
threat emanating from its territory).
Moreover, the state of New York put a
British subject on trial for murder arising
from the raid, incensing the British
government and public; the American
federal government took the position that
it did not have legal authority to intervene
or order him released. At several points
over the years of the dispute, war between
the United States and Great Britain
became a live possibility. Diplomatic
efforts, taken over in 1841 by U.S.
Secretary of State Daniel Webster and a
new British envoy to the United States,
Lord Ashburton (Alexander Baring),
produced agreement on the law, and
agreement to disagree on the facts. Soon
thereafter the border issues were largely
resolved by the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty.

Mutual diplomatic recriminations ensued
and border tensions ran high for years.
The U.S. side saw the raid as a flagrant,
unprovoked attack against a neutral state.
The British and Canadian side justified it
as necessary to deal with security threats
that the United States could not or would

Today, the Caroline incident is often
thought of as a seminal international legal
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episode about anticipatory self-defense.
Webster’s statement on behalf of the
United States, and Ashburton’s agreement
with this part, that a state must show “a
necessity of self-defense, instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation,” is
frequently invoked for the proposition that
a state may use proportionate force in selfdefense against “imminent” threats.
Although many international lawyers and
scholars probably know the outlines of the
story above, there is a rich and complex
history surrounding the Caroline incident.
These include, among others, the
historical context of the insecure border
areas of Canada and the United States
that gave rise to rebellion among some
Canadians and support for them among
some Americans; the raid on the Caroline
itself; reasons why the incident burned so
furiously in public opinion in both Britain
and the United States, even to the point of
creating a serious possibility of war; the
indictment and trial of British subject
under British command who (accounts
differ) took part in the raid and who was
individually charged with murder in
connection with it; the American federal
government’s apparent lack of legal
authority to end or remove the New York
criminal case; and the already deep and
complex economic relationships between
Britain and the United States that might
have been severely damaged by long-run
tensions or outright war.

Forcese’s book brings in rich, new
historical details mined from archives and,
moreover, provides additional
understanding of the international legal
context in which the Caroline affair took
place. This includes a discussion of murky
nineteenth-century thinking about the law
of military force below the threshold of
war, as well as the United States’ own
assertions of self-defense in earlier forays
into Spanish-held Florida. (In 1817–18,
the shoe was on the other foot, as the
United States justified military incursions
of Spanish territory on the grounds that
Spain was failing to prevent British,
Indian, and other enemies from
threatening the United States from
havens across their border.)
“Destroying the Caroline” also weaves the
account of international law on the resort
to force in the mid-19th century as it was
understood in that period together with
the story of the Caroline doctrine’s
influence and use—as well as misuse—by
states and international lawyers in
contemporary debates about the use of
force. Because the book is part history,
part analysis of contemporary debates,
and part links between them, it does not
simply proceed chronologically. For that
reason, it can sometimes feel like the
analytic and narrative thread is jumping
around; a virtue of this approach,
however, is that the book’s organization
makes it easy to pull specific chapters to
study carefully on their own.

This history, with its many strands, is
explored by University of Ottowa law
professor Craig Forcese in his excellent
new book, “Destroying the Caroline: The
Frontier Raid That Reshaped the Right to
War.” It’s a story that has been told
before; among those I have relied on are
John E. Noyes’s chapter in “International
Law Stories,” which focuses on the legal
dimensions, for example, and Kenneth
Stevens’s book, “Border Diplomacy: The
Caroline and McLeod Affairs in AngloAmerican-Canadian Relations, 18371842,” which focuses on the affair’s
international political dimensions.

One takeaway is that the Caroline episode
“is remembered by chance, and not design”
(p. 4). The book helps to at least somewhat
explain how such a modest military
incident takes on such grand international
legal significance. Part of that story is the
peculiar chain of citations to the episode,
including misunderstanding of its facts.
Part of that story also is the personalities
involved. Although the raid on the
Caroline occurs in December 1837, it is
not until nearly five years later that
Webster and Ashburton have their nowfamous exchange. That time lag is
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important. In the immediate aftermath of
the attack, international negotiation over
the matter fell mostly to a pair of
diplomatic mediocrities, U.S. Secretary of
State John Forsyth and British
Ambassador to the United States Henry
Steven Fox. Had the matter been resolved
quickly, it is unlikely that the incident
would ever have taken on such
international legal influence. It took the
great intellectual, diplomatic, and legal
firepower of their much more esteemed
replacements—combined with the timing
of their respective governments’
revitalized desire to resolve transatlantic
friction—to help provide some
authoritative clarity regarding the
customary law of the resort to military
force.

the last part of the book to revisit the
implications of the Caroline affair for
recent debates about preemption,
imminence, unwilling or unable
standards, and related concepts. (It
perhaps bears mentioning that what we
think of today as the contemporary debate
over “unable or unwilling” took place in
the diplomatic correspondence over the
Caroline, right down to the exact words:
“The [American] authorities,” wrote Sir
George Arthur to Lord Glenelg in 1838,
“were either unable or unwilling to
prevent aggression against Canada.”)
Forcese does not try to propose clear
resolutions to ongoing controversies, but
instead tries to consider various modern
arguments in light of the basic
considerations that Webster and
Ashburton wrestled with. In that effort I
agree with his skepticism of rigid
formalism and his conclusion that
Webster’s formula itself need not be read
as a bright-line rule, but instead can be
read to accommodate more flexible
standards.

Another takeaway is surprise that the
Caroline has come to be associated today
with customary state practice regarding
anticipatory self-defense. After all, by the
time of the raid, the insurgents using the
vessel (who included many Americans)
had crossed the Niagra River from New
York and occupied a piece of Canadian
territory. From there, they had shelled the
Canadian mainland and shipping on the
river. These developments arose weeks
before the Caroline raid, and more
insurgents and weapons were continuing
to arrive. As Forcese says, the Caroline “is
most easily viewed as an effort to degrade
a weeks-old attack and its expansion,
rather than as an attempt to forestall the
first blows of a not-yet mounted assault”
(p. 228). Yes, a standard for anticipatory
self-defense can be extrapolated from
Webster’s formula, but the actual facts
were not a clean case of it. I confess to this
error in my own past descriptions of the
Caroline. “This repurposing of the
Caroline in discussions of anticipatory
self-defence,” Forcese reckons, “is
astonishing” (p. 227). He is altogether
correct.

*

*

*

Forcese is Canadian, but (especially as an
American reader) I was reminded what an
interesting U.S. foreign relations law story
the Caroline affair is. The role of
international law in courts during the
episode is covered in other works like
those I cited earlier, but Forcese’s history
highlights some important U.S.
constitutional war powers dimensions, too.
Scholars of constitutional war powers
naturally focus on wars. From that
perspective, the 1830s are not a very
interesting period. The United States
fought a declared war in 1812 and
launched military expeditions in the
southeast soon after, and then it fought a
declared war against Mexico in 1846. In
between, relations along the U.S.-Canada
border don’t seem to offer much. But the
Caroline incident could very well have
escalated to war and, as I’ve argued
elsewhere in relation to the president’s

In light of the heavy contemporary
reliance on Webster’s formula, including
for anticipatory self-defense, Forcese uses
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“power to threaten war,” constitutional
war powers are just as much about wars
that didn’t take place, especially when war
didn’t take place because of a successful
threat.

was considerable. This prompted Congress
to extend the habeas statute to allow
federal courts to consider similar claims in
the future.
More broadly, the federal system was at
this time showing some strains in
assuring foreign sovereigns of its
adherence to international law. It
exhibited other weaknesses in assuring
peace, too. Soon after the raid, for
example, President Van Buren dispatched
Gen. Scott to the northern border—
ostensibly to defend the U.S. from further
incursions, but mostly to help suppress
direct support by Americans for the
Canadian rebels. Van Buren wanted Scott
to reinforce American neutrality.

In fall of 1841, according to Forcese’s
research, Gen. Winfield Scott—a hero of
the War of 1812—assessed the risk of
escalation to another war against Britain
at 50 percent. Although, as Forcese notes,
this figure may be significantly
overstated, the dangers were quite real.
He details how senior British officials,
from the prime minister on down, at
several points over this years-long saga
were fairly convinced that war might be
imminent.
Possible escalation scenarios included
local American public pressure to
retaliate; the possibility that New York
state officials might prosecute and, if
convicted, execute a British subject
suspected of having participated in the
Caroline raid; or that vigilantes from that
New York area might assassinate one.
Forcese details some steps along these
precarious paths, including the 1840
prosecution of Alexander McLeod, a
British military veteran arrested and
charged with an American death that had
occurred in the assault on the Caroline
three years earlier. He was ultimately
acquitted, but had he instead been
convicted and executed, war with Britain
would perhaps have been unstoppable.

Scott had few regular, federal troops to
work with, however. Most of those in
national military service at that time were
tied up fighting the Seminoles in the
South or guarding the western frontier. In
instructing Scott to therefore make use of
the militias of the northern states,
Secretary of War J.R. Poinsett warned the
general to enlist, as much as possible, only
those “exempt from the state of excitement
which the late violation of our territory
has created.” In other words, not only was
Scott forced to rely on state militia forces
that he knew were far inferior to federal
regulars, some of those state militia forces
were likely to be especially unreliable
because of their dubious loyalty to the
strict federal policy of neutrality. On top of
that, Scott lacked statutory authority to
do much with military forces in any case.

By the time McCleod was acquitted by a
New York jury, both the New York state
trial court and the New York state habeas
court had rejected the international law
argument—an argument advanced by
both the British and the U.S. federal
governments—that McLeod, like any
soldier, was immune from such personal
liability for a public act in service to his
sovereign. The takeaway for Britain and
foreign sovereigns was, in effect, that
America’s federal government was not
master of its own house in the conduct of
its foreign affairs. The reputational harm

Fifty years after the Constitution was
drafted, the Caroline incident turned on
its head certain important assumptions
and reasoning by some of the Framers as
to what was likely to lead to war and
what, by contrast, was likely to induce
peace. Many of those who would
eventually be called “Republicans” worried
that creating a powerful national military
establishment would make the United
States more prone to war. But the
Caroline affair is a chapter of American
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history in which the weakness of the
national military establishment created
serious risk of war. That same national
military weakness, moreover, made it
difficult for the United States to comply
with the international law of neutrality –
in considerable part from the inability to
compel its own citizens to comply. In this
case, a weak national military
establishment resulted in greater, not
lesser, risk to the Framers' desire that the
United States be viewed a respectable
member of the community of nations.
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